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Unions and Job Security in the Public Sector
ABSTRACT
This study examines the effect of unions on job security in the public and
private sectors. Despite much lower unemployment rates for public than private
sector workers, once one controls for differences in worker and job
characteristics, the odds of being unemployed are identical for nonunion workers
in the public and private sectors. The picture is quite different for union
workers, who face greater odds of becoming unemployed than nonunion workers in
private sector jobs but much lower chances of becoming unemployed in the public
sector. The ability of unions to reduce layoff and unemployment rates in the
public sector seems attributable to the political power to prevent budget cuts
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I.Introduction
The question of how public sector employers adjust employment in periods
of declining demand would not have been considered a serious issue until the last
half of the 1970s. Employment at both the state and local levels grew at such a
rapid and sustained pace before then that this issue arose only in a few isolated
cases. This all changed with the 1974-75 recession and the widespread adoption of
tax and expenditure limitations such as Proposition 13 in California. Since 1975,
government employment has declined as a share of total employment, and since 1980
it has stayed about constant in absolute terms. As a result, many governments
have been forced to make hard decisions about how to trim their payrolls.
This paper examines how public sector unions have been able to influence
these decisions. Studies by Medoff (1979) and Blau and Kahn (1983) on the
impact of unions on labor market adjustment in the private sector have found
much higher temporary and indefinite layoff rates for union than for nonunion
workers. There is mixed evidence on how unions affect permanent layoff
rates. Freeman and Medoff (1984) report that permanent layoff rates calculated
for 3-digit manufacturing industries between 1958 and 1971 and in 1981 show no
difference between industries that are predominantly unionized and those that
are not, but they also show that the May 1973-75 and 1977 Current Population
Surveys (CPS) for manufacturing workers indicate lower permanent layoff rates for
union members. Blau and Kahn find higher permanent layoff rates for union than
nonunion workers in manufacturing in the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS)
younger male cohort, but no union-nonunion difference for manufacturing workers
in the NLS older male cohort. When they expand these samples to include all2
sectors except construction, they find unionism has no effect on the probability
of permanent layoff for either younger or older males.
Section II compares the postwar trend in unemployment rates for private
and public sector workers and reports the first estimates of layoff rates for
public sector workers. These results show that although there has been some
convergence of the unemployment rates of these two groups, the odds of being on
layoff remain much lower in the public sector. Among public sector workers,
layoff probabilities are considerably lower for union members, a marked contrast
to the pattern of higher layoff rates under unionism in the private sector.
Sections III and IV compare both the theoretical and institutional factors
that influence employment adjustment decisions in the public and private sector
and point out how the impact of unionism is likely to vary between the two
sectors. The May 1973-75 and 1983 Current Population Surveys and the 1976-82
Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID) are used in Sections V and VI to estimate
public-private and union-nonunion differences in unemployment and layoff prob-
abilities. Section VII examines the impact of public sector unions on Unemploy-
ment Insurance (UI) coverage for state and local government employees before such
coverage became universal and estimates the impact of that coverage on
unemployment probabilities. The main results, summarized in Section VIII,
are: (1) unions reduce by a substantial amount the already low layoff and
unemployment probabilities in the public sector in contrast to those in the
private sector, where layoff rates are much higher under unionism, and (2)
nonunion public sector workers have temporary layoff rates and overall
unemployment probabilities comparable to those of nonunion private sector
workers.3
II. Public Sector Layoff and Unemployment Rates
Unemployment rates for all civilian workers and for government workers are
presented in Figure 1. Both series exhibit a rising trend over time, a reflection
of well known structural changes in the labor market. What is less apparent
in Figure 1, but can be shown easily in a simple regression equation, is that the
gap between these two unemployment rates has narrowed throughout this period. Let
UGOVunemployment rate for government workers, UTOT =unemploymentrate for
nonagricultural private wage and salary workers, and T =timetrend (1 for 1948,
38 for 1985). These variables were used to estimate the following equation:
UGOV =1.373÷ 0.086*UTOT -0.027*T+0.0117*T*UTOTR2=.854
(0.528) (0.095) (0.024) (0.0037)
This equation shows that for a given national unemployment rate, the unemployment
rate for government workers was considerably higher in the later part of the
sample period. For a civilian unemployment rate of 6 percent, this model predicts
that the government unemployment rate for 1948 would be 1.9 percent, but in 1985
it would be 3.5 percent. In other words, controlling for the overall state of the
labor market, unemployment of government workers is almost twice as high today as
in the late 1940s.
Mean layoff rates for public and private sector workers from the 1973-84
May CPS are reported in Table 1. These layoff statistics represent the share of
the labor force unemployed in the survey week because of a layoff. They are not
at all comparable to the layoff rates that used to be published by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS), which reported the fraction of workers (instead of the
labor force) laid off in a particular month (rather than all previous
months). The sample is restricted to the May surveys because of the availability4
of data on union status in that month and the computational burden of using all
of the monthly tapes over a 12-year interval. One problem with using the May
survey for estimating public sector layoff rates is that educational employees
are unlikely to be on layoff in that month. To adjust for this bias, separate
estimates are reported for the public sector, with schools, colleges, and
universities excluded from the sample.
Temporary layoffs are those with recall within less than thirty days,
whereas indefinite layoffs are those with recall within thirty days or more or
those with no definite recall date. Because of the very small number of public
sector workers experiencing either of these types of layoffs, the sum of these
two layoff rates is reported in Table 1. Both are distinguished from permanent
layoffs by the expectation of recall. The permanent layoff rate is the fraction
of the experienced labor force consisting of unemployed workers who said they
started looking for work because they had lost their previous job.
Average temporary and indefinite layoff probabilities in May for 1973
through 1984 are about four times greater in the private than in the public
sector. Between 0.6 and 2.4 percent of the experienced labor force in the private
sector was on temporary or indefinite layoff during those years. The corre-
sponding layoff probabilities for the public sector are not only much lower, but
also their range is much narrower--between 0.2 and 0.5 percent for all public
sector employees and between 0.2 and 0.6 percent for public sector employees
excluding education. Although the time period under consideration is quite
narrow, the patterns for 1975-76, 1980-81, and 1982-83 indicate that the peak in
layoff rates for the public sector lags that for the private sector by one
year. There is no evidence that the ratio of the public to the private temporary
and indefinite layoff rate has changed between 1973 and 1984.5
Permanent layoff rates also are much greater in the private sector, but
the relative gap between public and private permanent layoff rates seems to have
narrowed in recent years. Between 1973 and 1977, permanent layoff rates were
about three times larger in the private sector than in the public sector (two and
a half times larger when education is excluded from the public sector). This gap
has narrowed to about two and a half times larger between 1978 and 1984 (two
times larger when education is excluded from the public sector), This narrowing
is largely attributable to upward drift in the permanent layoff rate in the
public sector. The layoff rate for all public sector employees was 0.5 percent in
1973 and 1974 but never fell below 0.8 percent in later years. The pattern is
more pronounced when education is excluded; the layoff rate was 0.7 and 0.6
percent in 1973 and 1974 but never fell below 1.1 percent thereafter.
Starting in 1982, the CPS public use tapes identify public sector workers
by level of government, which allows separate layoff rates to be computed for
federal, state, and local employees (see Table 2). There is very little
difference in the average temporary and indefinite layoff rates among these three
groups over this period. Permanent layoff rates are slightly higher for federal
and local than for state employees in 1982 and 1983, and are much higher for
federal than for state and local employees in 1984. The pattern for 1984
apparently reflects the continued pressure for nonmilitary cuts in the federal
budget.
Even though the average public employee is subject to a very low layoff
risk, this may be attributable to differences in the type of work between the
public and the private sector. To determine whether any public sector workers are
subject to layoff risks comparable to those for the average private sector
worker, layoff rates for public and private sector employees are reported for6
selected industries in Table 3. Because of small samples in individual years, the
data are summarized in three-year groups.
These results show that the risk of temporary or indefinite layoff is
greatest for public sector jobs in construction, utilities, and federal and
state public administration. However, these layoff rates are almost always far
below those for the average private sector worker in Table 1. The only exceptions
to this general trend are employees in state public administration in 1976-78 and
in urban transit in 1982-84. The odds of temporary or indefinite layoffs are
practically zero in education and the postal service. Permanent layoffs in the
public sector are most likely to occur in construction, utilities, and local
public administration. Except for construction, these layoff rates are also well
below those in the private sector in Table 1.
The public-private comparisons within particular industry groups for
temporary and indefinite layoffs in Table 3 show that layoff rates are roughly
equal in the public and private sectors in transportation, utilities, hospitals,
and education, but that private sector layoff rates are much higher in construc-
tion. The patterns for permanent layoffs are quite different. Although the
private sector has higher permanent layoff rates in construction, transportation,
and elementary and secondary schools, the public sector has higher permanent
layoff rates in utilities and hospitals. These patterns suggest that careful
controls for industry characteristics will be needed to estimate accurately
the difference in layoff and unemployment probabilities between the public and
private sectors.
Comparisons of mean layoff rates for union and nonunion workers in the
public and private sectors are reported in Table 4. These can be computed only
for 1973-1975 and 1977 because in all other years unemployed workers were not7
asked about union membership. Within the public sector, temporary and indefi-
nite layoff probabilities are slightly lower (0.1 percentage points) for union
workers. The average gap in permanent layoff rates is also rather small in
three out of the four years. However, the exception to this overall tendency is
a very important one. In 1975, at the trough of a severe recession, the permanent
layoff rate for nonunion public employees was twice as large (1.4 percent) as
that for union workers (0.7 percent). This suggests that when the pressure for
layoffs is greatest, union workers in the public sector have a much better chance
of keeping their jobs than nonunion public employees. The exact opposite pattern
is observed in the private sector, where union members have considerably higher
layoff rates than nonunion workers.
Further evidence on differences in unemployment and layoff rates between
the public and private sectors for 1976 to 1981 from the PSID is reported in
Table 5. Separate rates are reported for heads of households and wives. In both
samples the percentage of respondents experiencing unemployment during a
particular year as well as the percentage who lost their last job because of a
permanent layoff (including plant closings and dismissals) are much higher in the
private than the public sector. Because of the considerably smaller sample
sizes and the shorter time period for which data are available, it is very
difficult to spot any convergence of private and public unemployment or layoff
rates in the PSID.
III. Unions and Public Sector Layoffs: Theory
Demand shocks are likely to differ between the public and private sectors
because of differences in technology and consumer characteristics. For instance,
labor demand in agriculture and construction fluctuates a great deal over the8
course of a year because of the dictates of seasons and weather, whereas except
for elementary and secondary education, public sector labor demand Consists of
services provided throughout the year. Demand for public services is also
relatively insensitive to conditions in credit markets, in contrast to some
goods produced in the private sector, such as construction and durable
manufactures. These arguments indicate that there will be less seasonal and
cyclical variability in demand for public than for private goods, which will
result in lower layoff rates in the public sector, other things equal.
Even if public and private employers had to deal with the same labor
demand shocks, there are still a number of reasons to expect them to have
different layoff rates. Two obvious factors are purely technological -- public
services cannot be produced for inventory in periods of slack demand and they are
very labor intensive. As a result, cuts in government budgets almost always
require some cuts in payroll.
These cuts must be obtained by some combination of reduced wages, reduced
hours, or reduced employment. Most government jobs are at the state and local
levels, where wage studies such as Smith (1977) and Freeman (1985) tend to find
rates equal to those in the private sector. In such a situation wage cuts would
produce savings in the short run but would eventually result in higher turnover
and excessive recruiting, hiring, and training costs. Wage cuts in federal jobs
would be less likely to create these problems, as all studies have found those
rates to be well above those paid in comparable private sector jobs. The tradeoff
between hours and employment cuts will be heavily influenced by the attractive
fringe benefit packages offered by most public sector employers and the
relatively small amount of specific on-the-job training in many government jobs,9
especially in education. Both of these factors will make it more economical to
use layoffs instead of hours reductions in many public sector jobs.
This assumes, however, that all downward shifts in demand are actually
translated into budget cuts. Throughout the 1970s state and local governments
were highly successful in obtaining federal aid under various guises (revenue
sharing, CETA) to maintain programs that would have been terminated other-
wise. On various occasions local governments also have received fiscal infu-
sions from state governments. This avenue of revenue enhancement is not available
to the federal government, but it does not have to meet the balanced budget
constraint that most state and local governments face. All of these examples
illustrate how governments can find substitutes for tax revenue (some of which
are automatically tied to local unemployment rates and thus indirectly tied
to the revenue of state and local governments) to maintain their budgets and
thereby avoid layoffs.
Freeman (1985) has shown that public sector employment has less year-to-
year variability than private sector employment. His study, along with the
results on mean layoff rates in Table 1, also suggests that the cyclical pattern
in public sector employment lags that observed for private sector employment.
These patterns probably result from differences in sources of revenue
between the public and private sectors. Much of the revenue of state and local
governments comes from sources well insulated from cyclical behavior, such as
property taxes and intergovernmental grants. (Fluctuations in revenue would
arise mainly from income and sales taxes, which would vary with output and sales
in a particular state, county, or city.) This dampens the impact of any shock.
Lags in making- adjustments to any given shock result from the political
process, If these lags are long enough, managers in the public sector have more10
time to plan their manpower responses to declines in demand. This allows them to
make greater use of hiring freezes, which allow them to reduce their adjustment
costs by (1) avoiding hiring persons who will later have to be laid off and (2)
using attrition to reduce the number of employees, thereby avoiding the costs of
layoffs (severance pay, unemployment benefits, reputation). An adequate planning
horizon is absolutely essential for hiring freezes to be a very useful adjustment
device. The incentive to use hiring freezes and attrition in the public sector in
place of layoffs will be offset to some extent by low rates of voluntary
turnover, which result in smaller reductions in employment levels through
attrition than in the private sector.
It would be inappropriate to discuss public-private differences in layoff
probabilities and completely ignore Unemployment Insurance (UI). Today almost
all private and government employees are covered by UI, so differences in
coverage are not likely to create differences in employee preferences for layoffs
relative to other adjustment devices. The low unemployment rates in the public
sector make it quite unlikely that any group of public sector workers will
collectively receive more in benefits than they spend on payroll taxes. In fact,
many governments finance UI benefits for their workers through direct reimburse-
ment rather than using payroll tax contributions. Thus, UI will encourage layoffs
to a lesser degree in the public than the private sector.
The above discussion indicates that the factors likely to influence layoff
decisions in the public sector are quite distinct from those in the private
sector. In the absence of collective bargaining, no unambiguous predictions can
be made about how layoff and unemployment rates are likely tovary between the
public and private sectors.11
Under collective bargaining median voter models predict that in both the
public and private sectors, greater weight will be given to the preferences of
older, less mobile workers in the determination of personnel policies. Except
in cases of drastic declines in demand, these workers will prefer a policy of
layoffs based on seniority. Such a policy completely insulates them from any
cutbacks in wages or hours that might otherwise be required.
Another factor behind the preference of unions in the private sector for
seniority-based layoffs is the union-nonunion differential in UI subsidies. This
is not likely to be important in the public sector because, as noted above, the
financing mechanisms and low layoff rates result in effective self-insurance.
Furthermore, supplemental unemployment benefits are rarely provided in union
contracts in the public sector. These two factors suggest that the union-
nonunion gap in layoff rates should at least be smaller in the public than the
private sector.
In addition, there are unique aspects of unionism in the public sector
that could result in lower layoff rates for union workers in that sector.
Freeman (1986) argues that public sector unions have the ability to shift the
demand curve for their services through political activity. Public sector union
members represent a significant part of the electorate in many state and local
elections. This allows them to use both political power and bargaining power to
push for higher wages and membership. In addition the utility function of
public sector unions will put a higher weight on membership because additional
members give them even more political leverage. Whether public sector unions are
actually successful in obtaining higher wages and employment is an empirical
question, however, because they can also serve as a lightning rod for attracting
political opposition to the higher taxes required to fund higher payrolls.12
This political dimension of union behavior in the public sector is likely
to influence layoffs through two different channels. First, the observed lag of
employment in the public sector suggests that unions as well as managers have the
opportunity to plan strategies for avoiding layoffs. This can be done in a
variety of different ways, such as moderation in wage negotiations or political
pressure within the appropriate government body to keep its payrolls
intact. Second, public sector unions at the local and state levels can also push
for additional revenue from higher levels of government as a substitute for any
drop in local or state tax revenues. For instance, in Congress public sector
unions have been strong supporters of CETA which, under Titles I, II, and VI
granted sizable sums for public employment programs. These programs prevented a
number of cities from having to lay off municipal employees.
On balance, the effect of unions on layoffs in the public sector cannot be
predicted ante. Although the most senior workers would prefer a system of
layoffs based on seniority if payroll cuts are required, the potential politi-
cal power of unions may enable them to prevent such cuts from taking place or
make them considerably smaller than they would have been in the absence of
collective bargaining.
IV. Unions and Public Sector Layoffs: Institutions
Rules and procedures governing layoffs in the nonunion segment of the
public sector, if they exist at all, are determined by legislation or
regulation. There has been only one study to my knowledge of layoff policies in
the public sector. A survey of state governments done by the Bureau of National
Affairs (1982a) found that twenty states based layoffs primarily or solely on
seniority, twenty-four have policies that take both seniority and performance13
into account, and six states have no laws or policies on layoffs. Even in states
in which layoffs are based on both seniority and performance, managers sometimes
do not have much discretion in deciding who is to be laid off. For instance, in
Utah layoffs are based on the sum of the employee's rankings with respect to
previous performance evaluations and seniority. In many cases veterans are given
special preference in layoff or recall procedures.
During the 1981-82 recession a number of states revised their layoff
procedures to ensure that recent gains in hiring women and minorities were not
eradicated by "last hired, first fired" policies. Bureau of National Affairs
(1982b) identified five states in which state agencies were required to maintain
a percentage of women and minorities after a layoff equal to that in the agency
prior to the layoff. In many other cases, managers were instructed to take
affirmative action into consideration along with other criteria in deciding which
persons were to be laid off and which were to be recalled.
Under collective bargaining in the private sector, procedures for layoffs
are almost always specified in the union contract. Freeman and Medoff report that
seniority is the most important factor in determining who gets laid off in about
80 percent of all contracts. Five different studies by BLS of contract provisions
between 1970 and 1975 indicate that these practices were not as widespread in the
public sector. The percentage of employees covered by agreements containing
various layoff-related provisions in these studies is reported in Table 6. Most
of the municipal agreements in cities with populations of 250,000 and over in
1970 contained no provisions regarding layoffs. This can be attributed to a
combination of three factors: (1) the recentness of most collective bargaining
relationships in that period, (2) layoff procedures already specified by
ordinances or civil service regulations that in many cases were presumably based14
at least in part on seniority, and (3) the rapid growth in municipal employment
that had taken place in preceding years. Given these three factors, most unions
at that time apparently placed little priority on bargaining over layoff and
recall provisions. Collaborating evidence for the BLS studies is found in
Eberts's (forthcoming) study of over 500 New York school districts in the
mid-l970's --only20 percent of public school teachers were covered by RIF
provisions.
Even five years later, the share of union contracts containing layoff and
recall provisions in the public sector, although much higher than before, was
still much smaller than that in the private sector. Only 65 percent of the
contracts during this period contained language pertaining to layoffs and only 35
percent specified recall rights. Both figures are considerably higher than their
counterparts in 1970, which no doubt reflects the decline in the fiscal health
of many cities over this period as well as increased experience with how layoffs
are conducted under civil service rules. Perry's (1979) case study of nine school
systems also points out a trend toward a greater percentage of union contracts
containing layoff provisions. He found that in 1967 contractual provisions
regarding layoffs were "virtually nonexistent." Ten years later, the contracts in
eight of the nine districts contained language regarding layoffs.
Even if union contracts in the public sector are still less likely to
address layoff issues than contracts in the private sector, it seems safe to
conclude that much greater weight is given to seniority in determining layoffs in
governments with collective bargaining agreements than in those without
collective bargaining. There is also evidence that contract provisions do affect
layoff decisions in the public sector. Eberts shows that RIF provisions are15
correlated with much lower separation rates for teachers in school districts with
declining enrollment, especially for teachers with more than nine years of
experience.
Layoff provisions are far from the only mechanism that public sector
unions have to influence government behavior. Levine, Rubin, and Wolohojian
(1981) discuss a case in Oakland where the firefighters union used binding
arbitration to reverse a city council decision to eliminate 26 positions in
1975. In other cases unions have exerted political pressure to prevent
cutbacks. For instance, in 1976 the police and firefighters unions in Cincinnati
petitioned for a referendum to freeze staffing at current levels (the petition
did not pass). To protest the proposed transfer of a state-managed hospital in
Pennsylvania, Wilburn and Worman (1980) report that five unions successfully
joined forces to exert pressure, including radio, newspaper, and television
advertisements telling residents in the area where the hospital was located that
it was vital to their welfare.
A final factor that may be important in some of the period under study
here is the endogeneity of UI coverage for many state and local employees before
December 1974. Before 1972, when state employees in hospitals and higher
education were brought into the system, relatively few state and local public
sector employees were covered by UI. Some states had voluntarily decided to
cover their own employees and a few even had laws requiring all local employees
to participate. Title II of the Emergency Jobs and Unemployment Assistance Act of
1974 (PL 93-567) brought almost all state and local workers into the
system. Although this program was supposedly a temporary measure prompted by the
1974-75 recession, the Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976 made these
changes permanent. Before these federal statutes were enacted, however, the16
political power of public sector unions is likely to increase the odds of UI
coverage in areas that were heavily unionized. This presumably would result in
somewhat higher layoff rates, other things equal. This issue will be examined
more closely in Section VII.
V. Evidence from the Current Population Survey
To identify the separate effects of unionism and public sector status on
layoff probabilities, two specifications were estimated over the May 1973-75
CPS. The first includes separate dummies for union and public sector status; the
second adds a union-public sector interaction term. The extremely large sample
size precludes estimation of probit equations. OLS results for the entire sample
are reported in Table 7; probit results for the second specification for one-
fourth of the sample, randomly selected, appear in Table 7A. Temporary layoff
equations could not be estimated for the random sample because none of the public
sector workers in the smaller sample were on temporary layoff.
A. Public-Private Comparisons. How do layoff rates for public and private
sector workers compare? Once controls for union status and other job and
personal characteristics are included, are the layoff probabilities for public
sector workers still very small relative to those of private sector employees?
The answers from the first specification largely reaffirm the results from Table
1. For all three types of layoffs under consideration, the OLS results indicate
that layoff rates are much lower in the public sector: 0.1 percentage points
lower for temporary layoffs, 0.4 percentage points lower for indefinite layoffs,
and 0.7 percentage points lower for permanent layoffs.
The second model allows these comparisons to be made separately for union
and nonunion workers. The results show that, except for permanent layoffs, the17
public-private difference in layoff rates for nonunion workers is much smaller
than the public-private difference for union and nonunion workers combined.
There is no public-private difference in temporary layoffs for nonunion workers.
The public-private difference in indefinite layoffs is much smaller for nonunion
workers than for union and nonunion workers combined.
Events initiating spells of unemployment for the experienced labor force
include not only layoffs, but also quits and labor force re-entries. To get a
complete picture of how job security compares in the public and private sectors,
quits and labor force re-entries should also be examined, especially the latter.
Previous research by Clark and Summers (1979), among others, shows frequent
transitions between the states of unemployment and out of the labor force. These
transitions have raised the question of whether being unemployed is behaviorally
distinct from being out of the labor force, as many transitions could arise from
measurement error or temporary cessation of job search. There is a clear
possibility that many of the persons who are classified as labor force
re-entrants were laid off before the survey period. If so, then ignoring labor
force re-entrants may result in a biased comparison of public and private sector
job security.
The drawback with using the information on labor force re-entry is the
difficulty in interpreting the results. It is impossible to distinguish between
persons who left their last jobs voluntarily and those who were laid off.
Despite the problems with interpretation of labor force re-entrant behavior, the
empirical results should provide a more complete picture of relative job
stability in the public and private sectors. The impact of union and public
sector status on unemployment attributable to labor force re-entry, along with18
unemployment resulting from quits and total unemployment regardless of source is
reported in the last three rows of Tables 7 and 7A.
In both models workers whose last job was in the public sector are much
more likely to be unemployed labor force re-entrants than workers whose last job
was in the private sector. The results for the second model show that this
relationship holds for nonunion, but not union, public sector workers. Nonunion
public sector workers are 0.7 percent more likely than nonunion private sector
workers and 0.8 percent more likely than union private sector workers to be
unemployed force re-entrants. These results, although difficult to interpret,
suggest that the lower permanent layoff rates observed in the public sector may
not tell the entire story about job security in the public sector. One of two
things is certain: either the public-private difference in layoff rates for
nonunion workers is overstated in Tables 7 and 7A or unemployment resulting from
voluntary turnover is higher in the public sector for nonunion workers.
In contrast to other studies (e.g., Long (1982)) that have found lower
voluntary turnover in the public sector, the odds that a person will quit his
last job to search for a new job are no lower for public than for private sector
workers. The discrepancy between this finding and those of earlier studies is
probably attributable to the narrowness of the turnover variable in the CPS,
which does not report quits unless they are followed by a spell of unemployment.
Further evidence on quits from the PSID is reported in Table 8. (Details
on how the data set was constructed are reported in the next section.) These
results show that quit rates for heads of households are lower in the public than
private sector. In the model, which allows the public sector coefficient to vary
for union and nonunion workers, quit probabilities in the public sector are 2.1
percent lower for nonunion workers and 0.3 percent lower for union workers than19
for their counterparts in the private sector. The estimated public-private
differences for wives are very imprecise, indicating that there is no pronounced
quit differential for them. It is interesting to note that among both heads and
wives the impact of union status on quits is much smaller in the public sector.
The key issue for interpreting the labor force re-entry results in Tables 7
and 7A is how quits accompanied by unemployment compare for union and nonunion
workers in the public sector. To examine this question, the dependent variable
was set equal to one if a person quit the job held a year ago and experienced
unemployment during the past year. These results, reported in the last two
columns of Table 8, show a slightly lower probability of quits followed by
unemployment for union than for nonunion workers in the public sector. This
implies that the results in the first three rows of Table 7 actually overstate
the public-private difference in layoff rates and that a large share of the
unemployed labor force re-entrants who left public sector jobs did not do so
voluntarily.
The last row of Tables 7 and 7A compares the odds that public and private
sector workers will be unemployed for any reason. The first specification shows
unemployment rates are 0.9 percent lower in the public sector. This difference
narrows to a statistically insignificant 0.2 percent for the nonunion labor force
in the OLS results for the second specification. In the probit results, unemploy-
ment probabilities are the same in the public and private sectors for nonunion
workers. In other words, considering all possible causes of unemployment
together, nonunion public sector workers are just as likely to be unemployed as
nonunion private sector workers. The lower odds of permanent layoffs are offset
by the greater odds of being an unemployed labor force re-entrant.20
B. Public Sector Unions. In addition to the models in Tables 7 and 7A, another
way to compare the impact of unions on job security in the public and private
sectors is to estimate separate equations for each sector. The union coefficients
for each sector are reported in Table 9. Because of the great cost of estimating
probit equations (the results in Table 7A required 7995 seconds of CPU time), OLS
results are reported here.
Whereas union members in the private sector are much more likely to be on
temporary or indefinite layoff than nonunion members, this does not seem to be
the case in the public sector. The coefficients imply slightly lower temporary
and indefinite layoff rates in the public sector for union members, but the
standard errors are sufficiently large to prevent rejection of the null
hypothesis of no union-nonunion difference.
The impact of unionism on permanent layoffs also is completely different
in the public and private sectors. In the private sector, union members are just
as likely to be laid off permanently as nonunion workers. In the public sector,
permanent layoff rates are 0.4 percent lower for union than nonunion workers.
These results on layoffs imply that public sector unions have been much more
successful in promoting job security than their private sector counterparts.
The evidence on unemployment due to quits and labor force re-entry as well
as the evidence for all types of unemployment combined is consistent with this
implication. Union members are less likely to become unemployed re-entrants in
both sectors, but the impact of unionism is greater in the public sector both in
proportional and absolute terms. Surprisingly, although union members in the
private sector are less likely to quit their jobs and become unemployed, there is
no union-nonunion difference in this type of quit behavior in the public sector.
Looking across all types of unemployment, the results in the last row of Table 921
show that union members are 0.4 percent more likely than nonunion workers to
become unemployed in the private sector but 1.2 percent less likely in the
public sector.
C. Retrospective Evidence for 1982. Two key limitations of the results from
the 1973-75 CPS are that (1) during that period employment in the public sector
was still growing and (2) many union contracts did not contain layoff
provisions. Since then, government budgets have been squeezed by legislation to
limit taxes and expenditures as well as by a recession more severe than that in
1974-75. This would presumably give unions less political flexibility to maintain
public sector payrolls, while at the same time make union members more sensitive
to job security issues and in all likelihood increase the share of union
contracts containing rules on layoffs. As a result, one would have good reason to
question whether the results for 1973-75 are still pertinent today.
These results cannot be replicated for more recent years because after
1977 the CPS stopped asking unemployed workers about union status at their
previous job. One alternative approach is to use the May 1983 CPS, which reports
union status for half the sample (instead of a quarter of the sample, as in
all other surveys since 1981) and matches these records with the March 1983 CPS,
which contains retrospective data on unemployment during 1982. At the cost of
restricting the sample to employed workers, union-nonunion differences in
unemployment during 1982 can be estimated for both the public and private
sectors.
Unemployed persons in the May 1983 sample consist of those who either were
recalled to their old jobs or were successful in finding new jobs. Those who were
still jobless at the time of the survey are omitted from the sample. This should
be kept in mind when interpreting the results; they are not directly comparable22
to those reported from the 1973-75 CPS. Three different independent variables are
examined: a dummy equal to one if the respondent was unemployed during 1982,
spells of unemployment during 1982, and weeks of unemployment during 1982. Probit
equations were estimated for the dummy dependent variable; OLS was used for the
other dependent variables. The distinctions between union and nonunion as well as
private and public workers are based on the job held at the time of the
survey. (The models were also estimated over a data set in which these distinc-
tions were based on the longest job held in 1982. The results were basically the
same and are not reported here.)
With regard to union-nonunion differences, the results in Table 10 are
comparable to those in the last line of Table 7. Considering all possible
causes of unemployment, there is no difference in the probability of unemploy-
ment in 1982 or spells of 1982 unemployment between union and nonunion workers in
the model without interaction between union and public sector status. When the
interaction is added to the model, the number of spells is slightly higher for
union than nonunion workers in the private sector, but there is no difference in
weeks of unemployment or unemployment probabilities for union and nonunion
workers in the private sector.
The key result of a negative union impact on unemployment probability in
the public sector from the 1973-75 CPS continues to hold for the 1982 CPS. This
is demonstrated by the large negative interaction coefficients in Table 10 and by
the union coefficients for public sector workers in Table 11. Focusing on the
latter, the results show that public employees belonging to unions were 2.3
percent less likely to have been unemployed in 1982 than nonunion public
employees.23
The only finding from the 1973-75 CPS that does not carry over to the
more recent sample is that pertaining to public-private differences in unemploy-
ment probabilities for nonunion workers. Nonunion public employees were 4.4
percent less likely to have been unemployed in 1982 than nonunion private
employees. They also had significantly fewer spells and weeks of unemployment in
1982. This result is most likely attributable to either the restricted sample
in the May 1983 CPS or the lagged response of public sector layoffs to downturns
in economic activity documented in Table 1; it need not be inconsistent with
the findings in Table 7.
Table 11 also reports separate union coefficients for federal, state, and
local workers. Although the union coefficient is slightly higher for federal
than for state or local workers, the difference is not significant.
VI. Evidence from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics
The PSID has reported both union status and class of worker on a continuous
basis since 1976. The main advantages of exploring this data set are that it
spans the period between the two CPS samples and that it can be used to estimate
fixed effects models. A possible disadvantage is that the PSID sample consists of
households that have been continuously tracked for 14 years, and such households
are likely to be less than perfectly representative of the labor force.
Two different indicators of job security are examined: (1) whether the
respondent is currently unemployed or was unemployed in the past year and (2)
whether the respondent lost his previous job because he was laid off or fired
or because his company closed (job losses for any of these reasons will be
referred to as layoffs below). Survey responses to these questions in year t+l
are regressed on independent variables for year t. As in the CPS, the sample is24
restricted to wage and salary workers. When using the PSID, the question always
arises as to whether observations from the 1967 Survey of Economic Opportunity
(SEO) subsample should be included. In this case the coefficients are relatively
insensitive to composition of the sample, so observations from the SEO subsample
are included in the results reported below. Splitoff households formed during the
sample period and persons who were self-employed during any of the sample years
are deleted to facilitate data set management. Separate models are estimated for
heads of households (assumed by the PSID to be the male in two-earner households)
and wives.
The PSID results for heads in Table 12 show that, just as in the CPS, the
odds of being unemployed are about the same for public and private sector workers
not covered by collective bargaining. In the model without any interaction
between union and public sector status, union employees have a 3.8 percent higher
probability of being unemployed; public sector employees, a 3.1 percent lower
probability. However, this model restricts the impact of unionism to be the same
in both the public and private sectors. When this restriction is removed by
adding a union-public sector interaction term, there is no longer any significant
difference between the odds of being unemployed in public and private sector jobs
for nonunion workers. Union workers in the private sector are 4.8 percent more
likely to have been unemployed than nonunion workers, but there is no difference
in unemployment probabilities in the public sector between union and nonunion
workers.
Wives who are union members working in the private sector are 6.4 percent
more likely to experience unemployment than nonunion workers in that sector. In
the public sector, union members are 1.2 percent less likely to have been25
unemployed than nonunion workers. Among nonunion workers there is once again no
significant public-private difference in unemployment probabilities.
Unionism has little impact on the odds that a person in the PSID will lose
his job in either the public or private sector. The union and union-public
sector interaction coefficients are both not significantly different from zero,
in contrast to the CPS in which the interaction was negative. Household heads
working in the public sector are 2.1 percent less likely to lose their jobs
regardless of union status, but the odds of job loss for wives are equal in
the public and private sectors.
The unemployment and job loss probability equations were also estimated
separately over samples of public and private sector employees, allowing for
complete interactions with all independent variables instead of union status
alone. These results, reported in Table 13, further accentuate the differential
impact of unionism on unemployment probabilities. Among household heads, union
members are 4.8 percent more likely to experience unemployment in the private
sector but 0.3 percent less likely in the public sector. The results for wives
are even more striking. They have a 5.7 percent higher unemployment probability
under unionism in the private sector but a 3.9 percent lower probability under
unionism in government jobs. Union status is uncorrelated with job loss probabil-
ities in either the public or private sector.
The models reported in Table 12 were also estimated separately for male
and female heads, as well as for whites and nonwhites within both the heads and
wives samples. These results, available upon request, point to the same conclu-
sion as in Tables 11 and 12: union workers in the private sector have higher odds
of becoming unemployed than nonunion workers, but in government jobs unionism is
associated with equal or lower unemployment probabilities.26
A final way to establish the robustness of this result over these samples
is to estimate a fixed effects model. Although it is now widely accepted that
such models are not a panacea for biases associated with unobserved heterogeneity
of workers who obtain jobs in the public and private sectors, it would be
difficult to be very confident in the findings in Table 12 if they were com-
pletely inconsistent with the results from a fixed effects specification. The
fixed effects results for heads (see Table 14) are quite similar in terms of the
signs of the coefficients to the results reported above. The decrease in the size
of the coefficients and the increase in the size of the standard errors is not
surprising in light of results obtained in other studies with fixed effects
estimators. However, in the wives sample, the coefficients actually tend to be
somewhat larger in the fixed effects results. There is no readily apparent
reason for this unusual result. Whatever the reason, it is quite clear, even in
the fixed effects results, that the impact of unionism on the odds of becoming
unemployed is quite different in the public and private sectors.
VII. Public Sector Unions and Unemployment Insurance
Relatively few state and local government workers were covered by UI
until the beginning of 1972. In 1960 about 280,000 state and 53,000 local
government workers were covered by UI, almost all of them living in New York,
Connecticut, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Oregon, and the District of
Columbia. In the fourth quarter of 1971, coverage had grown to almost 600,000
state and 220,000 local government employees, but it was still concentrated in
the same states as before, plus Washington and Hawaii. Despite the rapid growth
of public sector unionism during this period, there was virtually no change in
the coverage of public employees until the Employment Security Amendments of27
1970, which brought state employees in hospitals and higher education into the
system, became effective at the beginning of 1972. At roughly the same time Ohio,
Florida, Illinois, Texas, Pennsylvania, Iowa, Louisiana, and Oklahoma provided UI
coverage to most other state employees. Fourteen states took steps to cover
additional state and local government workers in 1972, 1973, and 1974. By the end
of 1974, 2.5 million state and 1.5 million local government employees were
covered. This represented about 75 percent of all state employees and less than
25 percent of all local employees.
Almost all state and local workers were brought into the UI system by
Title II of the Emergency Jobs and Unemployment Assistance Act of 1974. This
program was instituted as a temporary measure to help deal with the fiscal
stress many state and local governments were facing at the time. Benefits for
state and local government workers were provided directly by the federal govern-
ment. Coverage of state and local government workers became permanent under the
Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976, which became effective at the
beginning of 1978. Benefits are financed through either regular contributions to
the state fund or direct reimbursement.
Before all state and local government workers were brought into the system,
coverage rates tended to be higher in states with large percentages of public
sector workers belonging to unions, as shown in Table 15. In a simple regression
of the percentage of local workers covered by UI on percentage of public sector
workers belonging to unions (federal, state, and local) over the 21 states that
can be identified in the May 1973-75 CPS, the union coefficient (S.E.) is 1.370
(0.584). The union coefficient in the same regression for coverage of state
workers was 0.528 (0.357).28
On the surface these results suggest that union pressure was a significant
factor contributing to UI coverage in the public sector before 1974. However,
four of these twenty-one states had high coverage rates in 1960, well before
public sector bargaining was very widespread. If these four states are dropped
from the sample, the union coefficient (S.E.) drops to 0.319 (0.484) in the state
employee coverage rate equation and to 1.060 (0.656) in the local employee
coverage equation. Thus, it is not at all clear that public sector unions can
take the credit or the blame for the growth of UI coverage.
Did the changes in coverage have a big effect on unemployment rates? This
can be tested over a sample of state and local public administration workers in
the May 1973-75 CPS residing in states or SMSAs that can be matched with data on
UI coverage rules and percentage covered by UI. During this period we observe
differences in coverage rates across states in 1973 and 1974 and differences in
coverage rates within some states between 1973-74 and 1975. Specifications
included either three regional dummies or a complete set of 38 state dummies and
were estimated for the entire 1973-75 sample as well as for a separate 1973-74
sample. All six unemployment measures used in the results reported in Tables 7
and 9 were examined as dependent variables.
Of the forty-eight equations estimated, only one had a significant UI
coverage coefficient. A representative set of results using state dummies over
the 1973-75 sample is reported in Table 16. Unless public administration
employees are not representative of the work force in the public sector, these
results indicate that UI coverage did not contribute to unemployment, even in a
period when the federal government was paying some of the benefits. There are two
likely explanations. First, other federal programs including CETA provided29
assistance to governments under fiscal stress and these programs may have made
layoffs unnecessary. Second, there was no UI subsidy in cases for which the
federal government was not paying the benefits.
VIII. Conclusion
This paper has shown that despite the much lower observed unemployment
probabilities for workers in the public sector, once one controls for differences
in worker and job characteristics, the odds of being unemployed are identical in
the public and private sectors for nonunion workers in the May 1973-75 CPS and
the PSID. Even though public sector jobs are less subject to seasonal and
cyclical shocks and cyclical patterns lag those in the private sector, these
factors seem to be exactly offset by the inability to produce for inventory and
the labor intensity of the production process in the public sector. Although the
May 1983 CPS indicates lower unemployment probabilities for nonunion public
sector workers than for nonunion private sector workers, this could very well be
attributable to the restriction of the sample to employed persons or the lag of
public sector layoff rates behind those in the private sector. One important
implication of this result is that failure to account for differences in job
security is not likely to systematically bias the results of public-private pay
comparisons.
This paper's other major conclusion is that the impact of unions on
unemployment and permanent layoff probabilities varies substantially between
private and government jobs. The odds of being unemployed are much higher under
unionism in the private sector, but they tend to be lower for union than nonunion
workers in the public sector. Previous studies have attributed the higher layoff
rates for union members in the private sector to the greater weight given to the30
preferences of older workers under unionism, as reflected by the widespread use
of layoffs by seniority in downturns, and larger benefits while unemployed (both
from UI and supplemental benefit plans). The adjustment process in the public
sector operates differently because the political power of public employee unions
can be used in many cases to prevent budget cuts, an optimal outcome for both
senior and junior employees. When cuts are necessary, the absence of any UI
subsidy or supplemental benefits makes layoffs a less attractive option for
members of public sector unions than other adjustment mechanisms such as wage
moderation.Table 1. Percentage of experienced labor
worker












1973 .63 .17 .25 1.45 .51 .67
1974 .70 .18 .25 1.59 .53 .61
1975 2.44 .22 .32 3.62 1.22 1.53
1976 1.15 .35 .44 3.01 1.19 1.47
1977 .93 .27 .37 2.62 .85 1.12
1978 .72 .22 .29 2.09 .89 1.12
1979 .72 .15 .16 1.75 .84 1.13
1980 1.92 .27 .34 2.57 .98 1.30
1981 1.42 .36 .36 2.82 1.40 1.91
1982 2.08 .35 .42 4.06 1.66 1.93
1983 2.06 .50 .59 4.98 1.99 2.47
1984 1.24 .31 .43 3.09 1.36 1.72
Source: May CPS public use tapes
Table 2. Percentage of experienced public
and level of government
sector labor force on layoff, by year
Temporary and indefinite layoff Permanent layoff
FederalState Local FederalState Local
1982 .31 .37 .35 1.66 1.50 1.73
1983 .47 .63 .46 2.11 1,83 2.01
1984 .47 .12 .33 1.82 1.30 1.23
Source: May CPS public use tapes32
Table3. Percentage of experiencedlabor force on Layoff, by timeperiodand industry
Temporaryandindefinite Layoff Permanentlayoff
Industry 1973-751976-78 1979-81 1982-84 1973-75 1976-78 1979-81 1982-84
Constructi on
PubLic .75 .22 .50 .17 1.09 2.19 2.38 3.61
Private 3.15 2.84 3.70 4.63 5.97 5.95 5.48 9.12
Street railways,
bus lines
Public .22 .00 .20 1.30 .45 .55 .55 1.17
Private .00 .53 .29 .88 .61 1.43 2.35 3.70
Utilities and
sanitary services
PubLic .00 .72 .24 .90 .90 1.14 1.64 2.61
Private .20 .24 .09 .60 .57 .60 .89 1.55
HospitaLs
Public .20 .20 .14 .27 1.11 .67 .47 1.62
Private .12 .12 .16 .50 .62 .82 .72 .99
Elementary and
secondary schools
Public .03 .12 .24 .23 .26 .59 .56 .92
Private .16 .08 .19 .14 .30 1.29 1.31 1.50
Colleges
PubLic .18 .12 .14 .22 1.05 .47 .53 1.60
Private .26 .26 .00 .37 .60 1.12 1.06 1.35
Postal service .13 .24 .08 .04 .34 .32 .08 .43
Federal public
administration .26 .38 .40 .29 .71 1.21 .95 1.42
State public
administration .46 .96 .44 .46 .56 .97 1.38 1.33
Local pubLic
administration .08 .34 .19 .45 1.10 1.23 2.00 2.16
Source: May CPS public use tapes33
Table 4. Percentage of experienced Labor force on layoff, by year, cLass of worker, and union status
Temporary and indefinite layoff Permanent Layoff
Private sector PubLic sector Private sector Public sector
Year Union Nonunion Union Nonunion Union Nonunion Union Nonunion
1973 1.22 .45 .24 .16 1.74 1.36 .37 .55
1974 1.54 .44 .08 .22 1.88 1.50 .71 .47
1975 5.56 1.58 .04 .28 4.26 3.45 .72 1.38
1977 1.80 .69 .20 .30 2.98 2.52 .67 .93
Source: May CPS pubLic use tapes34
Table 5. Unemployment incidence and permanent layoff rate by household status,
year and class of worker
Percentage experiencing Permanent layoff rate
unemployment during year
Year Private sector Public sector Private sectorPublic sector
A. Heads of Households
1976 14.6 7.1 4.8 0.6
1977 14.1 4.3 4.2 1.0
1978 13.0 5.0 3.5 0.7
1979 12.9 6.3 3.7 0.7
1980 16.6 5.5 4.4 1.7
1981 16.7 5.4 5.9 2.2
B. Wives
1979 12.8 11.8 4.1 2.2
1980 13.9 9.7 4.1 0.0
1981 15.6 8.6 6.1 2.5
Source: PSID; SEO subsample excludedTable 6. Percentage of workers covered by collective bargaining
selected layoff provisions
agreements with
Police State and State and State and
Municipal and fire county local local
agreements agreements, agreements, agreements, agreements,
1970 1972-73 1972-73 Jan. 1, 1974July 1, 1975
Reference to
reduction inforce 15.0 46.2 62.0 65.2
Advance notice
of Layoff 4.7 23.9 24.1
Union role in
reduction in
force 1.7 12.3 16.9 19.8
Bumping
procedures 6.4 26.5 28.3
Recall rights 18.6 12.6 31.9 30.8 35.2
Source: BLS Bulletins 1759, 1861, 1885, 1920, 1947
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Table 7. Coefficients of union and public sector status in CPS unempLoyment probability
equations, by cause of unemployment
Model 1: No interaction Model 2:Union-public sector
interaction
Mean of
Dependent dependent Public Public
variable variable Union sector Union sector Interaction
1. Temporary .25 .205 -.104 .287 -.008 -.388
Layoff (.035) (.052) (.038) (.056) (.080)
2. Indefinite .81 .527 - .419 .735 - .175 -.983
layoff (.062) (.092) (.069) (099) (.143)
3. Permanent 1.91 - .168 - .689 -.061 - .563 -.508
Layoff (.094) (.141) (.105) (.151) (.219)
4. Re-enter 1.81 -.347 .392 -.192 .574 -.733
labor force (.091) (.137) (.102) (.147) (.213)
















Note: All equations are estimated by OLS from a sample of 154937 observations from the May
1973-75 CPS. Each equation also contains the foLlowing variabLes: age and its
square, years of schooLing completed, and binary indicators of race (1), sex (1),
marital status (1), region (3), occupation (11), industry (39), and year (2).Table 7A.Coefficients of union and public sector status in CPS unemployment
probit equations, by cause of unemployment.























































Note: All equations are estimated over a sample of 38739 observations randomly
selected from the pooled May 1973-75 CPS. Each equation contains the
same additional variables as in Table 7, except that there are 34 industry
dummies. Partial derivative of probability of unemployment at mean
values of independent variables is reported in brackets.38




All quits during year
Heads of Heads of
Model 1: No interaction households Wives households Wives
Union -.206 -.295 -.253 -.214
(.040) (.087) (.067) (.161)
[.026] [-.048] [-.006] [-.007]
Public sector -.134 -.030 -.175 -.203
(.054) (.082) (.094) (.158)
[-.017] [-.006] [-.004] [-.007]
Model 2: Union-public sector interaction
Union -.235 -.375 -.231 -.235
(.045) (.113) (.072) (.188)
[-.030] [-.059] [-.005] [-.008]
Public sector -.171 -.065 -.141 -.215
(.060) (.088) (.103) (.169)
[-.021] [-.012] [-.003] [-.007]
Interaction .128 .200 -.138 .076
(.090) (.173) (.177) (.352)
[.018] [.041] [-.003] [.003]
Mean of dependent variable .083 .127 .023 .022
Sample size 13873 3796 13873 3796
Note: All equations are estimated over the 1976-82 PSID. Each equation also
contains the following variables: age and its square, tenure with
employer and its square, years of schooling, number of children, and
binary indicators of race (2), region (3), occupation (5), industry
(8), and year (5 for heads, 2 for wives). Dummies for sex and marital
status (1) are also included in the equation for heads.39
Table 9. Coefficients of union status in CPS unemployment probability equations,
by cause of unemployment and class of worker














2. Indefinite .956 .684 .131 -.077
layoff (.076) (.056)
3. Permanent 2.170 -.143 .728 - .370
layoff (.113) (.130)
4. Re-enter 1.854 - .211 1.588 - .734
labor force (.105) (.188)








Note: Sample and control variables are the same as in Table 7. There are
127482 observations in the private sector equation; 27455, in the
public sector equation.40
Table 10. Coefficients of union and public sector status in unemployment
equations, May 1983 CPS
Model 1:No Model2: Union-public
interaction sector interaction
Mean of
Dependent dependent Public Public
variable variable Unionsector Union sector Interaction
1. Unemployed .148 -.032 -.329 .022 - .234 -.255
during 1982 (.028)(.048) (.032) (.053) (.068)
(yes=1) [-.006][-.060] [.005] [-.044] [-.046]
2. Spells of .219 .005- .099 .027 -.073 -.072
unemployment (.010)(.017) (.012) (.019) (.021)
during 1982
3. Weeks of 2.487 - .331- .896 - .224 - .774 -.346
unemployment (.131)(.222) (.157) (.242) (.278)
during 1982
Note: Equation 1 is estimated by probit and equations 2 and 3 are estimated
by OLS from a sample of 22803 observations from the May 1983 CPS. Each
equation also contains the following variables: age and its square,
years of schooling completed, and binary indicators of race (1), sex
(1), marital status (1), region (3), occupation (11), and industry
(37).Table 11. Coefficients of union status in unemployment equations, May 1983 CPS,
by class of worker
Dependent variable
Unemployment Spells of Weeks of
during1982 unemployment unemployment
(yes 1) during 1982 during 1982
Union Union Union
Sample N Meancoefficient Meancoefficient Meancoefficient
(S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.)



































Note: Sample and specification are the same as in Table 10, except that six
industry dunmiies are used in each equation.
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Table 12. Coefficients of union and public sector status in PSID unemployment probit
equations
Model1:No Model 2: Union-public
interaction sector interaction
Sample and Mean of
dependent dependent Public Public
variable variable Union sector Union sector Interaction
A. Heads
(N=1 3873)












































Note: Estimation method and control variables are the same as in Table 8.Table 13. Coefficients of union status in PSID unemployment probit
equations, by class of worker
Private sector Publicsector
Union Union
Sample Mean coefficient Mean coefficient
(S.E.) (S.E.)
A. Heads























Note: Sample and control variables are the same as in Table 12.
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Table 14. Fixed effects estimates of PSID unemployment probability equations
Model1: No Model 2: Unionpublic
interaction sector interaction
Public Public

















Note: The dependent variable equals one for those who were unemployed during
the year; zero, otherwise. Each equation also includes tenure with employer and
its square, number of children and binary indicators of marital status (1),
region (3), occupation (5), industry (8), and year (5 for heads, 2 for wives).Table 15. Public sector unionization and Unemployment Insurance coverage of
state and local employees.
Typeof UI Percentage
coverage, 1974 coveredby UI,
October1973 Percentage union
State StateLocal StateLocal members, public sector
Massachusetts N N 56 0 38.9
Connecticut M M 100 100 37.0
New York M E 100 3 49.0
New Jersey N N 34 0 29.9
Pennsylvania M N 100 0 39.0
Ohio M M 100 100 27.5
Indiana N N 50 5 21.2
Illinois M N 100 0 28.0
Michigan M M 100 100 43.3
Wisconsin M M 100 90 40.7
Iowa M N 100 1 11.7
Missouri E E 49 0 13.6
Virginia M E 100 0 10.2
North CarolinaN N 52 0 6.1
Georgia N N 50 1 6.9
Florida M M 100 100 12.9
Kentucky E N 44 0 7.4
Louisiana M N 100 1 10.5
Texas M E 100 0 7.5
California M E 100 19 23.6
Hawaii M M 100 100 54.7
M =mandatorycoverage
E =electivecoverage
N =nolaw on coverage
Sources: Type of UI coverage and percentage covered by UI are from U.S.
Congress (1976). Percentage union members for public sector employees
residing in each state is calculated from the May 1973-75 CPS, using
CPS sampling weights.
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Table 16. Coefficients of Unemployment Insurance coverage in unemployment
probability equations for state and local public administration



























































Note: All equations are estimated by OLS from a sample of 3819 observations.
Each equation also contains the following variables: age and its
square, years of schooling completed, and binary indicators of race (1),
sex (1), marital status (1), state (38), occupation (11), year (2), and
industry (1).47
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